Abstract
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is immune to detector side channel attacks, which is a notorious security loophole problem in QKD. Importantly, both finite-key effects and intensity fluctuations of the practical photon sources are nonnegligible in a full key rate analysis of practical QKD. In this paper, for the case with finite-key effects and without intensity fluctuations, we present a way to estimate the phase error rate for MDI-QKD and compare performances of the parameter estimation based on Hoeffding’s inequality and the Chernoff bound. By using Azuma’s inequality, we also present the finite-key analysis with composable security against general attacks for a biased decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol with intensity fluctuations. Our simulation results show that the effect of our phase error rate estimation is almost the same as the results in Phys. Rev. A 91, 022313 (2015) [CrossRef] , and the parameter estimation using the Chernoff bound is tighter than that using Hoeffding’s inequality. In addition, the influence of intensity fluctuations is more obvious when the data size of total transmitting signals is small. Our results highlight that it is important to keep the stability of the intensity modulator and estimate accurately the emitted pulse’s intensity for practical implementations.
© 2019 Optical Society of America
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